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COPY September 2, 2004 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 0 2 200*1 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc. Court of Appeals case number 
20030071-CA. Oral Argument was heard on August 30, 2004. 
Dear Clerk: 
Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") and National Surety Corporation ("National"), pursuant to the Rule 24(i) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, wish to cite supplemental authorities for this Court's consideration 
in the referenced case. Two new Utah appellate court decisions have been issued since Fox and 
National's last brief was submitted to this Court on or about March 11,2004. The citations to the two 
opinions are as follows: 
1. Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155 (2004). Specifically 
footnote 4 on page 161. A copy is attached for the Court's convenience. 
2. Johnson v. Department of Transportation, 2004 Ut. App. 284 (August 26, 2004). 
Specifically footnote 2 on page 9. A copy is attached for the Court's convenience. 
Both opinions address issues related to the application of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration to Fox's Memorandum in Opposition to Porter' Motion for Summary Judgment filed in 
the district court and the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Gary Porter Construction based, at 
least in part, on Rule 4-501. This issue was discussed at length during the oral argument and is also 
discussed in Fox and National's final Appellate Brief beginning on page 33. 
In Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. the Utah Supreme Court overlooks technical non-
compliance with Rule 4-501 because the purpose of the Rule 4-501 was met. Further, the second case, 
Johnson v. Department of Transportation was issued by this Court less than a week ago and has direct 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
September 2,2004 
Page 2 
application to the issue Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration in this case. The 
Johnson case applies the Salt Lake County case reasoning for evaluating compliance with Rule 4-501. 
Each of these cases discuss the proper application of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration in the context of motions for summary judgment when opposing memoranda may not 
meet all of the technical requirements of Rule 4-501. 
Sincerely, 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, RC. 
cc: Brian W. Steffensen 
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Utah Case Law 
SALT LAKE COUNTY v. METRO WEST READY MIX, INC., 2004 UT 23 
89 P.3d 155 
Salt> <Lake>^  <County, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, and Monterra Rock Products, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20020701. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
FILED March 23, 2 004. 
Third District, Salt Lake City, The Honorable Sandra Peuler. 
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David E. Yocom, Don H. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Mark R. Clements, Mark H. Richards, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
f 1 In this appeal we address whether a purchaser who obtains 
title to property through a wild deed can be a bona fide purchaser under 
Utah's Recording Statute. 
|^ 2 The dispute at issue is between Salt Lake County (the 
"County") and Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. ("Metro West") over the 
ownership of Parcel G, a fifteen-acre piece of property located in Utah 
County near the border between Utah and Salt Lake Counties (the 
"Property"). The County received legal title to the Property on December 
4, 1878; however, it failed to record its deed in the Utah County 
Recorder's Office until June 17, 1998. 
% 3 Nine years before the County recorded its deed in Utah 
County, Metro West purchased the Property from the Property's purported 
owners. Metro West did so even though a record title search revealed that 
the owners had no record title to the Property. Metro West subsequently 
recorded its quitclaim deed in the Utah County Recorder's Office on April 
14, 1989. 
f 4 After learning of Metro West's claimed ownership, the County 
filed suit in 1999 to quiet title to the Property. The trial court found 
that Metro West was a bona fide purchaser under Utah's Recording Statute 
and granted summary judgment in favor of Metro West. The County 
appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed based on its newly-enunciated 
"apparent title rule." We reverse. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND[fnl3 
% 5 The United States Government conveyed the Property by land 
patent to William Turner in 1878. The Property is located in Utah County, 
with its northern border abutting the Utah County/Salt Lake County line. 
O-TVL/J. J_/i"XLVJLj W / W J . 1 A A T . ATJ.J-V J. J.«.w 
In 1878, Turner conveyed the Property to the County by warranty deed, 
which the County immediately recorded in Salt Lake County. In 1998, 
approximately 120 years 
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later, the County recorded its warranty deed in 
Utah County. 
f 6 Nine years before the County recorded its warranty deed in 
Utah County, Metro West's predecessor-in-interest, Lamona Farms, 
approached the purported owners of the Property, Darhl and Roena Tingey 
("the Tingeys"), and inquired as to the purchase price. The Tingeys 
represented to Lamona Farms's owners that the Tingey family had been in 
possession of and had used the Property since the turn of the century. The 
Tingeys would only agree to convey the Property, however, by quitclaim 
deed. The Tingeys explained that they were unable to convey the Property 
by warranty deed due to a 1,000-foot discrepancy in the Property 
description. This discrepancy, the Tingeys claimed, was created when the 
state of Utah began staking its section markers at both the north and 
south ends of the state. The Utah County Recorder's Office confirmed this 
discrepancy. 
f 7 Before purchasing the Property, one of Lamona Farms's owners 
and a title company both reviewed the records at the Utah County 
Recorder's Office and determined that nothing in the records conflicted 
with the Tingeys' ownership representations. It is undisputed, however, 
that the Utah County Recorder's Office never listed the Tingeys as owners 
of the Property, and that the Tingeys were strangers to the record 
title. 
% 8 The Tingeys conveyed the Property to Lamona Farms by quitclaim 
deed on April 14, 1989, for $25,000. Lamona Farms promptly recorded its 
quitclaim deed in Utah County. In 1991, Lamona Farms transferred the 
Property to Monterra Rock Products, Inc., which merged two years later 
into Metro West. [fn2] 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
K 9 In February 1999, the County filed an action to quiet title to 
the Property. Metro West filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 
that it possessed legal ownership of the Property because (1) it was a 
bona fide purchaser under Utah's Recording Statute, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-3-103 (2000); (2) it had adversely possessed the Property under 
Utah's Adverse Possession Statute, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7 to 
-13 (1996); and (3) principles of equity and public policy supported its 
ownership entitlement. The trial court granted Metro West's motion based 
upon Utah Code section 57-3-103 and the "undisputed facts that [Metro 
West] purchased [the Property] for valuable consideration and in good 
faith, and recorded its deed in Utah County prior to any recording there 
by [the County]." The County appealed. 
H 10 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. 
Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2002 UT App 257, 
53 P.2d 499. In so doing, the court of appeals announced an "apparent 
title rule," under which a purchaser is entitled to bona fide purchaser 
protection where the records are silent with respect to ownership "if the 
grantor had apparent legal title, even if he or she did not have perfect 
legal title." Id. at f 11. Apparent title, according to the court of 
appeals, is determined by considering "(1) whether the purported owner 
claimed to own the property; (2) whether the purported owner possessed 
the property; and (3) whether there was any activity or indication on the 
kJJT\J~/ X J-fX U V U V > / V ^ \ - / x ^ a. J . T . X . J L ^ ^ * » . v , . 
property that would raise questions as to who owned the property." Id. at 
K 13. Under this apparent title doctrine, the court of appeals 
reasoned that the trial court was correct in extending bona fide 
purchaser protection to Metro West because the records were silent as to 
the Tingeys1 ownership; the Tingeys had asserted that they had owned the 
Property since the turn of the century; the Tingeys were in possession of 
the Property; and the County did not have any signs or carry out any 
activity on the Property that would lead Metro West to believe that the 
Tingeys were not the legal owners of the Property. Id. at Kf 15-16. 
The County petitioned for certiorari review of the court of appeals1 
decision, which we granted pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(5) 
(2002). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
U 11 "When exercising our certiorari jurisdiction, we review the 
decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court." Mitchell v. 
Christensen, 2001 UT 80, K 8, 31 P.3d 572 (internal quotations 
omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). " [B]ecause a summary judgment presents 
questions of law, we accord no particular deference to the court of 
appeals1 ruling" and review it for correctness. Mitchell, 2 001 UT 80 at 
f 8 (citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. UTAH'S RECORDING STATUTE 
K 12 The County argues that the court of appeals erred in holding 
that a purchaser is protected under Utah's Recording Statute when he is 
on notice that his grantor has no record title to the property conveyed. 
We agree. 
f 13 Utah's Recording Statute provides as follows: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title 
is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the 
same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property 
in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly 
recorded. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-103 (2000) . [fn3] To be in good faith, a 
subsequent purchaser must take the property without notice of a prior, 
unrecorded interest in the property. See Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 
H 31, 44 P.3d 781. In addition, to be in good faith a subsequent 
purchaser must also take the property "without notice of any infirmity in 
his grantor's title." Pender v. Bird, 119 Utah 91, 96, 224 P.2d 1057, 
1059 (1950); see also Paldevco Ltd. P'ship v. City of Auburn Hills, No. 
202134, 1998 Mich. App. LEXIS 626, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) 
(unpublished per curiam decision) (noting " [a] good-faith purchaser is 
one who purchases without notice of a defect in the vendor's title" and 
that "[n]otice need only be of the possibility of the rights of another, 
not positive knowledge of those rights"). This notice is not confined to 
\JJ~U-J A XJITXJ.\JLJ \-/\^/\J± 1 A J. Y . AYAJ-/ JL A>.v-r n J-/v-r JL A 
situations in which a subsequent purchaser has actual notice of an 
unrecorded interest or infirmity in the grantor's title. Rather, it 
includes circumstances where a purchaser has constructive notice of such 
information, including both (1) record notice ""which results from a 
record or which is imputed by the recording statutes,' " and (2) inquiry 
notice ""which is presumed because of the fact that a person has 
knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to, 
knowledge of the ultimate fact.'" First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. 
Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998) (quoting 66 C.J.S. Notice 
§ 6 (1950)). 
H 14 The County argues that because a search of the Utah County 
records revealed that the Tingeys had no record title to the Property, 
Metro West was necessarily on inquiry notice of a defect in the Tingeys1 
title. According to the County, under this inquiry notice analysis the 
lack of record title would have led a reasonable person to have 
discovered the County's recorded title to the Property in the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office. Consequently, the County asserts that Metro 
West cannot be a good faith purchaser without notice under the recording 
statute. 
% 15 We agree that the Tingeys' lack of record title put Metro 
West on notice of a defect in the Tingeys' title. However, we do so not 
because Metro West was on inquiry notice of the defect, but because Metro 
West had both actual and constructive record notice of the defect, which 
precluded it from taking the Property in good faith. 
% 16 Because the Tingeys had no record title to the Property when 
they transferred it 
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to Metro West, the conveyance was carried out through 
what is commonly referred to as a "wild deed." See Poladian v. Johnson, 
85 So.2d 140, 140 (Fla. 1955) (en banc) ("A "wild deed' is one executed 
by a stranger to the record title. . . . " ) ; 11 Thompson on Real 
Property, Thomas Edition, § 92.11(c) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) 
("[A] "wild deed' [is one] executed by a grantor with no record ownership 
of the interest. . . . " ) . Few courts have addressed whether a purchaser 
who acquires title through a wild deed takes free of an unrecorded 
interest in the same property under the recording statutes. However, at 
least one commentator has expressly noted that a purchaser who takes 
title through a wild deed is not the type of purchaser that recording 
statutes protect. See Joyce Palomar, Patton and Palomar on Land Titles, 
§ 10 (3d ed. 2003) ("[T]he term "bona fide purchaser' as used in 
recording acts does not include one who buys from a stranger to the 
record."). And the majority of courts that have addressed the issue have 
held that a purchaser who receives property through a wild deed is not 
entitled to take free of an unrecorded interest simply by virtue of 
having recorded a purported conveyance of title executed by a stranger to 
the record title. See Holland v. Hattaway, 438 S_o.2d 456, 470 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that because "recording statutes do not 
support or validate a wild deed or any conveyance of an interest that the 
grantor does not have," an appellant whose chain of title traced back to 
the sovereign had superior interest over an appellee who could only trace 
title to a wild deed executed by a stranger to the record); Zimmer v. 
Sundell, 296 N.W. 589, 591 (Wis. 1941) ("If one who has no title under 
the laws governing conveyances is to have a superior one under the 
recording acts, it should be because he has relied upon the record, and 
when he purchases from one who is a stranger to the record title he has 
no grounds for such reliance."). But see Hyland v. Kirkman, 498 A.2d 1278, 
1284, 1289, 1295-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985). 
%JJTXXJ J. .LJ.TV1.VXJ W U J . ^ 1 X X v . X T X U X X W T f J-^ K-F J. J. 
f 17 We conclude that a purchaser whose chain of title is founded 
on a wild deed cannot be a bona fide purchaser under Utah's Recording 
Statute. As previously noted, to be in good faith a purchaser must 
purchase the property without notice of any defect or infirmity in the 
grantor's title. Pender, 119 Utah at 96, 224 P.2d at 1059. Because "[o]ne 
who deals with real property is charged with notice of what is shown by 
the records of the county recorder of the county in which the property is 
situated," Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 70, 1 P.2d 242, 247 (1931), 
and by implication charged with notice of what the records should show 
but do not, i.e., a lack of record title in a grantor, we hold that by 
definition a purchaser whose title is founded on a wild deed is on notice 
that his grantor had no record title to the property purportedly being 
conveyed. This is true in instances where, as in this case, the 
subsequent purchaser has obtained actual notice of this absence by 
searching the records. Moreover, it is also true even when the purchaser 
has no actual notice of the title defect, since all grantees of wild 
deeds are necessarily charged with constructive record notice by virtue 
of the recording statutes. Accordingly, a purchaser who acquires property 
through a wild deed will be held to have been on notice of a defect in 
his grantor's title and will not qualify as a subsequent purchaser in 
good faith for purposes of Utah's Recording Statute. 
f 18 This is not to say that a purchaser who acquires property 
through a wild deed can never acquire good title. We merely hold that the 
recording statutes do not protect such a purchaser as against an 
unrecorded interest in the same. See Huntington City v. Peterson, 
30 Utah 2d 408, 410, 518 P.2d 1246, 1248 (1974) (explaining that 
recording a deed does not pass title) ; Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 
1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("The recording statute's purpose is not to 
make the transfer of property effective as between the parties. . . . " ) . 
If a purchaser can establish that his grantor possessed and conveyed 
valid title to the property independent of the recording statutes, a 
conveyance through wild deed will be effective as against any competing 
claims. 
% 19 Applied in this case, because the Tingeys had no record title 
to the Property, Metro West was on notice of a defect in the 
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Tingeys' 
record title and therefore did not purchase the Property in good faith 
for purposes of Utah's Recording Statute. As such, it is not a bona fide 
purchaser and is not entitled to quiet title to the Property as against 
the County's unrecorded interest simply because it recorded its purported 
title first. If, however, the Tingeys acquired valid title to the 
Property through a means not reflected by the record, such as through 
adverse possession, the Tingeys conveyed valid title and Metro West would 
be entitled to quiet title to the Property as against the County. Because 
the record is insufficient for us to determine whether the Tingeys had 
valid title to the Property, we remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION 
f 20 Although not an issue reached by the trial court below, Metro 
West argues in the alternative that it is entitled to summary judgment 
because it established ownership of the Property through its own adverse 
possession. The County contends that not only do disputed material facts 
exist that preclude summary judgment in Metro West's favor, but that even 
if Metro West established all the necessary elements of adverse 
possession, Metro West is barred from acquiring title through adverse 
possession under Utah Code section 78-12-13 because the County designated 
the Property for a public use. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13 (2000). 
f 21 "[A]n appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on 
any proper grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other 
ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). To do so, 
however, the facts established in the record must be sufficient to 
support the alternative ground. See Renn v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 
904 P.2d 677, 685 (Utah 1995). 
H 22 In Utah, a person without legal title is deemed "to have been 
under and in subordination to" the owner with legal title unless that 
person has adversely possessed the property. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7 
(2000). When an occupant has entered into possession of property under a 
claim of title, the occupant may establish adverse possession by 
demonstrating that (1) the property was "occupied and claimed for the 
period of seven years continuously," id. § 78-12-12; (2) "the party, 
his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied 
and assessed [on the property]," id.; and (3) the property was, in 
pertinent part, "usually cultivated or improved," "protected by a 
substantial inclosure [,]" or "used . . . for the ordinary use of the 
occupant," id. § 78-12-9. 
H 23 To be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of adverse 
possession, Metro West must affirmatively show all the statutory elements 
of adverse possession. See English v. Qpenshaw, 28 Utah 241, 247, 
78 P. 476, 477 (1904) ("To overthrow [the] presumption [that the adverse 
party is not under subordination to the legal owner's title], the party 
claiming adversely ha[s] the burden to establish the fact [] by competent 
evidence. . . . " ) ; see also Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 93 n. 5 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) ("[B]ecause of the gravity of adverse possession claims 
— wresting title from otherwise rightful owners — claimants 
must strictly comply with all requirements.")/ 3 Am. Jur.2d Adverse 
Possession § 311 (1986). In this case, we find at least two key areas 
of dispute sufficient to render summary judgment inappropriate. [fn43 
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f 24 First, there are disputed facts as to whether Metro West's 
use of the Property was continuous during the required seven-year 
period. Metro West argued before both this court and the trial court that 
"[b]eginning in 1990 and continuing thereafter, Metro West improved [the 
Property] by bulldozing numerous access roads across the property[,] 
excavating and drilling numerous holes on [the Property,] and conducting 
regular sample testing of the underground materials." However, as the 
County argued to the trial court, whether the nature of this use was 
sufficiently continuous is in dispute. 
f 25 For example, prior to transferring the Property to Metro 
West, Dr. Richards, Lamona Farms's owner, could not specify during what 
period he or his employees occupied the Property. Dr. Richards also could 
not recall how many days his employees spent on the Property conducting 
testing. And, though he claimed that roads were being made on all of 
Lamona Farms's property continuously, Dr. Richards could not identify any 
times when such roads were made on the Property specifically because he 
did not know where the Property's boundaries were. Metro West also had no 
record of how many days its employees spent on the Property. Roy McNeil, 
one of Metro West's principals, testified that he knew Metro West had 
begun exploring dirt on the Property in 1998; however, he could not say 
when exploration had occurred between 1990 and 1995. 
H 26 Second, a dispute exists regarding whether Metro West paid 
property taxes on the Property for the seven-year period. As the County 
correctly asserts, the tax receipts submitted to the trial court do not 
indicate that the taxes being paid were specifically for the Property. In 
fact, not only do descriptions provided in the "property description" 
portion of the receipts differ from year to year, but the total acreage of 
land identified in the tax receipts changes as well. Based on the tax 
receipts provided in the record, it is impossible for us to determine 
whether the varied descriptions on the tax receipts were, in fact, 
attributable to the Property. 
f 27 Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Metro West continously used and paid taxes on the Property, Metro 
West is not entitled to summary judgment and we need not address whether 
disputed facts exist as to the remaining elements of adverse possession 
under Utah Code section 78-12-9. Moreover, having determined that Metro 
West is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of adverse 
possession, we need not reach the County's alternative argument that 
summary judgment would be barred by the "designated for public use" 
exception under Utah Code section 78-12-13. 
CONCLUSION 
% 28 To take free of an unrecorded interest in property under 
Utah's Recording Statute, a subsequent purchaser must purchase the 
property in good faith without notice of any defect in his grantor's 
title. Because a purchaser whose chain of title is founded on a wild deed 
necessarily has constructive record notice that his grantor's record 
title is defective by virtue of taking title from a stranger to the 
record, a purchaser who acquires property through a wild deed cannot be a 
good faith purchaser. Accordingly, Metro West is not a bona fide 
purchaser under Utah's Recording Statute and cannot take free of the 
County's unrecorded interest in the Property unless it establishes that 
the Tingeys obtained valid title to the Property through a means other 
than a recorded conveyance. Moreover, since genuine issues of material 
fact exist as to whether Metro West adversely possessed the Property, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. We therefore reverse and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
f 29 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and 
Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant's opinion. 
[fnl] Many of the facts recited herein are taken from the court of 
appeals' opinion. See Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 
2002 UT App 257, ^ 2-4, 53 P.3d 499. 
[fn2] To avoid confusion, we hereinafter refer to Metro West's 
predecessors-in-interest simply as Metro West. 
[fn3] Because this current section is identical to the code section 
applicable at the time the County filed its quiet title action, we cite 
the current code provision. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1994), 
with Utah Code Ann. § 57-3:103 (2000). 
[fn4] Metro West asserts that the County's failure to set forth in its 
opposing memorandum "a statement of facts it claims are in dispute as 
[required by] [r]ule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration" should result in our finding that Metro West's facts "be 
deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment and this appeal." It is 
., ^ ,
 v . ? _ v v . w ~ * - D ^ v w* w 
true that the County's opposing memorandum did not set forth disputed 
facts listed in numbered sentences in a separate section as required by 
the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 
4-501(2)(B). However, given that the disputed facts were clearly provided 
in the body of the memorandum with applicable record references, we find 
the failure to comply with the technical requirements of rule 4-501(2) (B) 
to be harmless in this case. See Hall v. NACM Intermountain, Inc., 
1999 UT 97, M 19-21, 988 P.2d 942 (noting the failure to 
specifically set forth a legal basis for the award of attorney fees in 
compliance with rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
was a harmless error because the court and both counsel always knew the 
purpose behind and the basis for the proposed award of fees). 
Accordingly, we examine whether the County's disputed facts are 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of Metro West. 
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Utah Case Law 
JOHNSON v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 2004> <UT> <App> <284 
Craig Johnson, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Department of Transportation, 
Granite Construction Company of California dba Gibbons & Reed Company, and 
John Does I-V, Defendants and Appellee. 
Case No. 20030142-CA. 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Filed August 26, 2004. 
Appeal from the Second District, Layton Department, The Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay. 
Stephen P. Horvat, Salt Lake City, and Erik M. Ward and Lindy W. 
Vandyke, Ogden, for Appellant. 
Stephen J. Trayner and H. Scott Jacobson, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Thorne. 
OPINION 
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge. 
I 1 Craig Johnson appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). We reverse and 
remand 
BACKGROUND.fnl] 
I 2 In the early morning hours of September 14, 1996, Craig Johnson 
was driving southbound on Interstate 15. As Johnson traveled over a 
section of freeway that was undergoing maintenance, the front left tire 
of his vehicle entered a twelve- to eighteen-inch-deep cutout in the 
pavement. Johnson lost control of his vehicle, which subsequently rolled 
through two more cutouts of similar depth. Johnson suffered permanent 
injury as a result of the accident. 
% 3 The road maintenance, joint repair, and slab replacement was 
performed by Granite Construction Company (Granite) pursuant to a contract 
it had with UDOT. Granite assumed a contractual duty to implement a 
traffic control plan designed by an unidentified UDOT employee. The 
traffic control plan channeled traffic around the work area in order to 
preserve the safety of motorists and maintenance workers. 
I 4 As part of the traffic control plan, Dyke LeFevre, UDOT's Region 
One Director, decided Granite would use barrels to separate the 
construction zone from the nearest travel lane rather than the concrete 
barriers customarily used when cutouts deeper than six inches are 
required. In reaching this decision, LeFevre relied upon prior 
conversations with the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) concerning 
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other projects, and brief conversations with UDOT's Deputy Director, 
which did not directly address whether to use barrels or barriers. Safety 
studies and cost-benefit reports were neither prepared nor relied upon 
during the decision-making process. The FHA reviewed and approved the 
traffic control plan. 
f 5 In a series of meetings and correspondence, Granite and the UDOT 
Project Engineer assigned to the road maintenance project expressed 
concerns over the degree of safety provided by the barrels. They 
requested that the traffic control plan be modified to employ barriers 
rather than barrels. In response to Granite's first detailed proposal to 
change the traffic control plan, UDOT informed Granite that "[LeFevre] 
does not feel that we could get approval from the [Transportation] 
Commission." UDOT went on to explain that "for us to justify the proposal 
for a change in the traffic control plan . . . the net cost of the change 
would have to satisfy two conditions: 1) be in the range of $450,000 or 
below and 2) time savings must be at least a 50 day time savingfs]." A 
revised proposal was submitted, to which UDOT did not respond. LeFevre 
testified in his deposition that he could authorize the change only if he 
could keep the project within budget and on time. 
1 6 Johnson filed suit against UDOT alleging negligence in the design 
and implementation of the traffic control plan. Specifically, Johnson 
asserted that UDOT was negligent in designing the traffic control plan to 
use barrels rather than barriers to separate the maintenance area from 
traffic, and authorizing Granite to open two lanes of traffic during 
off-peak hours, contrary to the traffic control plan. Johnson also 
claimed that UDOT was negligent in permitting various other deviations 
from the traffic control plan on the night of his accident including 
placing several barrels inside the cutouts rather than between the cutouts 
and traffic, failing to provide a white line between the cutouts and 
traffic lanes, failing to keep a buffer zone of two to three feet between 
the striping and the barrels, and failing to replace some missing 
barrels. 
I 7 UDOT moved for summary judgment arguing that: (1) UDOT did not 
have any duty to implement or monitor the traffic control plan, and (2) 
UDOT could not be held liable for the negligence of an independent 
contractor. Additionally, UDOT argued that even if it could be held 
liable, it would be immune from liability in this instance due to the 
"discretionary function" and "negligent inspection" exceptions to the 
Governmental Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1997). The trial 
court, adopting UDOT's reasoning, granted summary judgment in favor of 
UDOT. Johnson appeals.[fn2j 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 8 Johnson claims that the trial court incorrectly granted UDOTfs 
motion for summary judgment by premising its grant on a number of faulty 
legal conclusions. Johnson argues that the contract between UDOT and 
Granite did not protect UDOT from liability because UDOT could not 
delegate its duty to provide safe highways. Johnson also maintains that 
UDOT may be liable even though Granite was an independent contractor. 
Further, Johnson contends that neither the "discretionary function" nor 
the "negligent inspection" exceptions to the Governmental Immunity Act 
shield UDOT from liability. 
1 9 Summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary 
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judgment, we view "the facts in a light most favorable to the losing 
party below." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
636 (Utah 1989). "Because the question of whether summary judgment is 
appropriate is a question of law, we accord no deference to the trial 
court." Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2000 UT App 10, 1 14, 994 P._2d__824 
(quotations and citation omitted); see also Goodnow v. Sullivan, 
2002 UT 21, I 7, 44 P.3d 704. 
ANALYSIS 
f 10 UDOT solicited bids for the maintenance project based on 
specifications, provided by UDOT, including a traffic control plan. UDOT 
then awarded the contract to Granite. The contract provided that Granite 
"agrees to furnish all labor and equipment; to furnish and deliver all 
materials not specifically mentioned as being furnished by the Department 
and to do and perform all work . . . for the approximate sum of 
[$4,998,249.00]." The contract also required Granite to "provide, erect, 
and maintain barriers." The project required complete removal and 
replacement of multiple sections of the freeway. During the project, the 
twelve- to eighteen-inch-deep cutouts in various lanes were to be 
separated from traffic according to the traffic control plan. Any 
alterations of the traffic control plan required UDOT approval. 
1 11 Johnson asserts that UDOT had a duty to prevent unsafe conditions 
during maintenance performed by an independent contractor on three 
grounds: (1) the nondelegable duty of UDOT to ensure highway safety, (2) 
the "retained control" doctrine, and (3) the "peculiar risk" or 
"inherently dangerous work" doctrine. UDOT counters that it had no 
responsibility for highway safety associated with the project since, 
under the terms of the contract, Granite accepted responsibility for all 
work, including implementation of the traffic control plan. Further, UDOT 
argues that because Granite was an independent contractor of UDOT, rather 
than its "agent, servant, or employee," UDOT cannot be held liable for 
the physical harm caused to Johnson, and asserts that the "retained 
control" doctrine is inapplicable under the present facts. UDOT also 
contends that the "peculiar risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrine 
has never been adopted by the Utah courts and should not be adopted 
here. "fnb" 
I. UDOTfs Responsibilities Under the Contract and the Delegability 
of UDOT's Duty to Ensure Highway Safety 
% 12 UDOT argues that its contract with Granite absolved it of any 
duty to ensure the safety of conditions associated with the project. 
UDOT's argument fails under both principles of contract law and 
nondelegability of core governmental functions. "[A] party who delegates 
his duties under a contract to a third person is not relieved of his 
responsibilities, but rather remains ultimately responsible to the party 
with whom he contracted for guaranteeing the successful execution of the 
contractual duties." First Am. Commerce Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav. 
Bank, /43 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1987). Thus, the present contract could 
create a new duty of care in Granite for public safety, but the creation 
of Granite's contractual duty did not relieve UDOT of its preexisting 
statutory duty to provide safe highways. 
I 13 The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[c]ore functions or 
powers of the various branches of government are clearly nondelegable 
under the Utah Constitution." Salt Lake City v^ _ Ohms, 881 P. /.d 84 4, 84 9 
(Utah 1994). The inquiry focuses on whether the function or power that 
the branch of the government seeks to delegate involves a c_qre function 
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or power. See id. Examples of nondelegable functions and powers include: 
the supreme court's duty to discipline an erring attorney, see In re 
Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116, 116 (1970); legislative functions 
such as zoning and rezoning, see Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 
827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992); and legislative establishment of crime 
definitions and penalties, see State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 916 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). Thus, the proper inquiry here is whether the function 
delegated to Granite should be considered a core governmental function. 
See Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849. 
I 14 Utah Code section 72-1-201 creates UDOT and provides that 
UDOT shall: 
(1) have the general responsibility for planning, 
research, design, construction, maintenance, 
security, and safety of state transportation systems; 
(4) plan, develop, construct, and maintain state 
transportation systems that are safe, reliable, 
environmentally sensitive, and serve the needs of the 
traveling public, commerce, and industry. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-201(1), (4) (2001) (emphasis added). Specifically, 
UDOT may "close or restrict travel on a highway under [its] jurisdiction 
due to construction, maintenance work, or emergency," but UDOT must 
"cause suitable barriers and notices to be posted and maintained" in 
conjunction with any such closure or restriction. Utah Code Ann. § 72-6-114 
(2001). Furthermore, UDOT maintains regional offices "for the efficient 
carrying out of the duties of the department," and the region director is 
responsible for "supervising project development and operations of the 
state transportation systems." Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-205(1), (3)(b) 
(2001). Therefore, the duty to ensure highway safety is a core function 
of UDOT and is nondelegable. 
1 15 This conclusion finds support in McCorvey v. Utah State 
Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993). There, the 
plaintiff, a motorist, was injured on a section of Interstate 15 that was 
being resurfaced by an independent contractor under contract with UDOT. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that "[a]lthough [the independent 
contractor] was responsible for the actual resurfacing on the project, 
UDOT supplied the traffic control plan and was ultimately responsible for 
motorist safety." Id. at 42. The court reasoned that 
[The independent contractor] was responsible for 
setting up the signs necessary to control traffic 
flow through the project. However, UDOT had an 
on-site inspector who had the authority to modify the 
plan at any time. The UDOT inspector also oversaw the 
progress of the actual construction project and could 
correct any errors occurring there. 
Id. at 42 n. 3. Thus, even though Granite was responsible for the actual 
maintenance project, "UDOT supplied the traffic control plan and was 
ultimately responsible for motorist safety." Id. at 42. 
II. Granite's Status as an Independent Contractor and UDOT's 
Liability Under the "Retained Control" Doctrine 
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5 16 The "retained control" doctrine is an exception to the "general 
rule of nonliability of an employer of an independent contractor." 
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 1 14, 979 P.2d 322. The employer's duty 
under the "retained control" doctrine is "one of reasonable care under 
the circumstances" and is "confined in scope to the control asserted." 
Id. at SI 15. An employer who actively participates in the work of an 
independent contractor is subject to liability. See id. at 1 19. "[T]o 
have Nactively participated1 in the contracted work, a principal employer 
must have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative 
detail of that work." LcL_ at 1 20. 
SI 17 In Thompson, the supreme court concluded that the employer had 
not actively participated in the independent contractor's work because 
the employer merely exerted "control over the desired result" when she 
"direct[ed] that the pipe be installed over the pipe stub" and the 
contractor "determined the method for bringing about the desired result." 
Id. at f 24. Here, there is some confusion about the distinction between 
methods and results as they relate to the traffic control plan. UDOT 
clearly specified the particular result of the contract with Granite, 
namely the joint repair and slab replacement on a section of Interstate 
15. Although the contract did not require Granite to use any particular 
method for the removal and replacement of damaged sections of the 
highway, UDOT did specify the method for protecting the motoring public 
during the project. The traffic control plan can hardly be termed a 
result of the construction contract when the safety measures it provides 
do not endure beyond completion of the contract. Rather, the traffic 
control plan is the method through which the safety of the public is 
realized during the project. Moreover, Granite could not alter the method 
of ensuring the public's safety, the traffic control plan, without UDOT's 
approval. Thus, under the "retained control" doctrine UDOT may be liable 
for injuries caused by the traffic control plan if UDOT actively 
participated in that aspect of the project. The question of whether UDOT 
actively participated in the completion of the project therefore remains 
a fact question in this case. Such "issue as to [a] material fact" is not 
capable of being resolved on summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
III. The Governmental Immunity Act 
SI 18 UDOT urges that, even if liability is possible under one of the 
previously detailed theories, the Governmental Immunity Act protects it 
from suit in this instance. "[The Governmental Immunity] Act renders 
certain negligent actions which create unsafe highways subject to 
liability while granting certain others immunity." Keeqan v. State, 
896 P.2d 618, 623 (Utah 1995). 
A. "Discretionary Function" Exception 
f 19 "Discretionary function immunity . . . is designed to shield 
those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers of 
people in a myriad of unforeseen ways from individual and class legal 
actions, the continual threat of which would make public administration 
all but impossible.1" Id. (other quotations and citations omitted). Yet, 
"[n]ot every governmental action involving discretion is a discretionary 
function within the meaning of the Act." Trujillo v. Utah Pep't of 
Transp. , L999_TJ" App 22 7, SI 21, 986 P.2d 752. Our supreme court has 
"distinguished between discretionary and nondiscretionary decisions on 
the basis of whether the decision in question involves the formulation of 
policy or the execution of already-formulated policies." Ke_ej£anJL 896 P. 2d 
at 623. ,f[T]he discretionary function exception xshould be confined to 
those decisions and acts occurring at the "basic policy-making level," 
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and not extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the 
operational level . . . "which concern routine, everyday matters, not 
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors."1" Id. (citations 
omitted). "The reason for such a rule is plain, given the purpose of the 
discretionary function exception: "Where the responsibility for basic 
policy decisions has been committed to one of the branches of our 
tri-partite system of government, the courts have refrained from sitting 
in judgment of the propriety of those decisions.1" Id. (quoting Little 
v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983)). 
I 20 UDOT argues that the facts of this case are similar to Keeqan, a 
decision by our supreme court, wherein the discretionary function 
exception shielded UDOT from liability. Johnson, on the other hand, 
relies upon Trujillo, a more recent opinion by this court, wherein we 
held that UDOT had not demonstrated that the discretionary function 
exception shielded it from liability. We believe the facts here are more 
similar to Trujillo. 
1 21 In determining whether an act or decision is discretionary, we 
examine four questions. See Keeqan, 896 P.2d at 624. First, "s[d]oes the 
challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective?1" Id. (citation omitted). The 
decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers was part of a 
particular road maintenance project rather than being necessarily involve 
with a basic governmental program, such as preserving the state 
transportation system. If the decision involved whether or not to embark 
on a particular road maintenance project, for example, then the decision 
would necessarily involve a basic governmental program. In this 
instance, however, the decision to use barrels was simply an 
implementation detail of an already-decided project. See Andrus v. 
State, 541 P. 2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) ("The decision to build a highway 
and specifying its general location were discretionary functions, but the 
preparing of plans and specifications and the supervision of the manner i 
which the work was carried out cannot be labeled discretionary 
functions."). Second, "v[i]s the questioned act, omission, or decision 
essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, 
or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or 
direction of the policy, program, or objective?'" Keeqan, 896 P.2d at 624 
(citation omitted). The decision to use barrels was not essential to the 
accomplishment of a policy or program. Changing the traffic control plan 
to use concrete barriers would not change the course of a policy, 
program, or objective; it would simply change a detail of the project. 
Third, "s[d]oes the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of 
basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the 
governmental agency involved?'" Id. (citation omitted). As will be 
discussed in greater detail below, the decision to use barrels was based 
primarily, if not wholly, on economic considerations, rather than policy 
evaluation and expertise. Fourth, "N[d]oes the governmental agency 
involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful 
authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or 
decision?'" Id. (citation omitted). UDOT has the authority to change the 
traffic control plan to utilize barriers rather than barrels. 
f 22 The four questions are therefore directed to the nature of the 
act, omission, or decision. In ascertaining the true nature of a 
decision, courts have focused on the process by which governmental 
entities made the decisions. See Trujillo, 1999 UT App 227 at 1 33. 
Thus, the process leading to a decision is indicative of the decision's 
nature since all basic policy decisions are part of a process that 
includes extensive analysis. However, a clearly operational decision does 
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not become discretionary (in the sense contemplated by the exception) 
simply because it involves extensive studies, analysis, and discussion. 
See Biqelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980) (the discretionary 
function exception is "confined to those decisions and acts occurring at 
the basic policy making level, and not extended to those acts and 
decisions taking place at the operational level" (quotations and citation 
omitted)). UDOT?s decision surrounding the use of barrels or barriers is 
therefore the only decision potentially involving the discretionary 
function exception.[rn4J 
1 23 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Johnson, the 
process leading to LeFevre's decision to use barrels rather than barriers 
in the traffic control plan indicates that the decision was operational 
rather than discretionary. The parties dispute the process and discussion 
leading to the decision to use barrels. The process, however, involved 
minimal discussions between LeFevre and any UDOT or FHA official, either 
superior or inferior, and involved no formal safety or cost-benefit study 
or report. Moreover, like in Trujillo, the decision involved the 
"preparing of plans and specifications," Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 
1120 (Utah 1975), rather than the modifying of the existing highway as in 
Keeqan. In applying the discretionary function exception in Keeqan, our 
supreme court relied heavily on UDOT's comprehensive study, analysis, and 
department debate to conclude that UDOTfs decision not to raise a median 
barrier before the scheduled maintenance was protected by the 
discretionary function exception. See Keeqan, 896 P.2d at 625-26. The 
decisions made by UDOT in that case were found to be "truly discretionary 
functions" since they were "the result of serious and extensive policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise in numerous areas of concern," and 
"inherently bound up in economic, political, and safety considerations," 
as evidenced by a safety study report and a cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 
625 (quotations and citations omitted). 
f 24 The discretionary function exception protects the government from 
liability for decisions that expose the government to suit regardless of 
the option selected by the decision-maker. Keeqan exemplifies this type 
of decision: various projects unquestionably deserved funding, however, 
some could not be performed because of funding limitations. In such 
instances, the exception prevents government liability for those injuries 
that result from the failure to undertake projects that have not yet 
risen to a sufficiently high priority, as determined by the government, 
to merit the allocation of limited funds. Thus, the government must be 
granted immunity for decisions made when acting in that function so as to 
be able to perform that function at all. Unlike Keeqan, LeFevre's 
decision did not involve prioritization of mutually exclusive projects, a 
process that necessarily requires weighing of basic policies. Rather, 
LeFevre's decision involved the performance of an assignment after the 
discretionary function had already been exercised. LeFevre's decision was 
not of the type that would expose the government to liability regardless 
of the option chosen. Thus, the nature of the decision indicates that 
LeFevre was acting in an operational function. 
1 25 Moreover, the nature of LeFevre's position as UDOT Region One 
Director indicates that his position mainly involved operational 
decisions rather than discretionary functions involving policy 
evaluation, balancing, and judgment. Utah Code section 72-1-2 0 5 reads, in 
pertinent part: 
(1) The department shall maintain region offices 
. . . for the efficient carrying out of the duties 
of the department. 
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(3) The region director is responsible for: 
(a) executing department policy within the region; 
(b) supervising project development and operations 
of the state transportation systems within the 
region; and 
(c) promoting the department's public involvement 
and information programs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-205 (2001) (emphasis added). In contrast, the 
Transportation Commission is responsible for making policy judgments and 
"determining priorities and funding levels of projects in the state 
transportation systems." Utah Code Ann. § _7_2-l-_3_03 (1) (2001). Even 
LeFevre's deposition supports this distinction: "If I could have found a 
way to afford [the use of barriers] and keep the cost and time factor of 
the project, I probably could have made that decision, but where it 
involved extra cost, it probably would have had to go back clear to the 
commission to even be considered." LeFevre could not have been acting in 
a discretionary function in this instance since he was constrained by the 
project budget and had no authority to alter it. Although we do not 
declare that UDOT Region Directors never engage in discretionary 
functions, the structure and duties of UDOT and the Transportation 
Commission suggest that UDOT Region Directors generally engage in 
operational functions. Thus, the nature of the decision-maker's position 
and the process involved in making the decision indicate that the 
decision to use barrels rather than barriers was an operational, 
nondiscretionary function. 
B. "Negligent Inspection" Exception 
f 26 The contract between UDOT and Granite required Granite to follow 
the traffic control plan, which included certain traffic control 
devices, in order to protect the project, the workers, and the public. 
Several deviations from the traffic control plan existed on the night of 
Johnson's accident: no white striping delineated the construction zone 
from the nearest travel lane; no buffer zone existed between the 
construction zone and the travel lane; the barrels were placed inside, 
rather than outside, of the pavement cutouts; and some barrels were 
missing. 
% 27 UDOT claims that the "negligent inspection" exception shields 
UDOT from any liability that may arise from UDOT's failure to properly 
inspect or monitor Granite's work. The negligent inspection exception 
provides "a narrow immunity for inspections to allow inspectors to perform 
their work without fear that an oversight which later causes injury would 
give rise to liability on the part of a governmental entity." Ericksen 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 658 ?.2d 995, 998 (Utah 1993) . In other words, 
the exception "was intended to immunize only the conclusions and results 
of an inspection where the inspector may have overlooked something or 
made a faulty judgment in deciding whether to approve or reject the 
subject of the inspection." Id. Essentially, "[t]he conclusions and 
results of the inspection are not to be second-guessed by courts and 
juries." Id. 
1 28 The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he question of 
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whether a governmental entity is liable for the negligent inspection of 
property most frequently arises when the entity undertakes inspections to 
assure compliance with building, fire, electric and other safety codes." 
Id. at 997; see also Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270 
(Utah 1995). This Court subsequently observed that both Ericksen and 
Nixon "stressed immunity for . . . governmental inspections of property 
owned by third parties to determine whether the property complied with 
safety codes." Ilott v. University of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, 1 14, 
12 P.3d 1011 (emphasis added). When private property is involved, the 
negligent inspection exception allows the government to undertake 
regulatory activities for the benefit of the general public without the 
risk of liability. See Ericksen, 858 P.2d at 998. Here, UDOT was not 
engaged in a regulatory activity. Rather, UDOT inspected Granite's work 
for compliance with the contract to be performed on property owned by 
UDOT. Similar facts were present in Ericksen. There, a construction 
inspector employed by the city was inspecting a new facility at the Salt 
Lake City International Airport when his conduct injured one of the 
contractor's employees. See id. at 996-97. Although Ericksen was decided 
on other grounds, the Utah Supreme Court indicated in dicta that 
inspections of public property by the owner of that property should be 
treated differently from regulatory inspections of private property. See 
id. at 997. 
I 29 Similarly, in Ilott, this court held that the negligent 
inspection exception did not protect the University of Utah from 
liability for injury caused by a defect in its stadium bleachers because 
the University was inspecting its own property, and had a specific duty 
to the injured party. See Ilott, 2000 UT App 286 at II 14-15. Although 
UDOT?s inspections here may have been for the benefit of the general 
public, Ericksen and Nixon both suggest distinct treatment for inspections 
of private property versus inspections of property owned by the 
inspecting governmental entity. Thus, because UDOT was inspecting 
property owned by the government, the negligent inspection exception does 
not shield UDOT from any liability that may exist for failing to properly 
monitor and inspect Granite's work. 
CONCLUSION 
I 30 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment dismissing UDOT from the case, and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
I 31 WE CONCUR, Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge, William A. 
Thorne Jr., Judge. 
[fnl] Because Johnson appeals from summary judgment entered against him, 
we recite the facts in the light most favorable to him. See Kouris v. 
Utah Highway Patrol, 2003 UT 19, I 5, 70 P.3d 72. 
[fn2] UDOT relies heavily on the trial court's ruling dismissing the 
facts on the first four pages of Johnson's memorandum in opposition to 
summary judgment for failing to comply with rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2) (B) ("The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement of each 
of the movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a 
genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material facts 
which support the party's contention."). UDOT urges us to limit the scope 
of our appellate review only to those facts considered by the trial 
court, and directs our attention to Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 2 91, 
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77 P.3d 339, for the proposition that "a trial court may exercise its 
discretion to require compliance with the Rules of Judicial 
Administration, particularly rule 4-501, without impairing a party's 
substantive rights." Id. at 1 9. We agree. However, Fennellfs 
noncompliance with rule 4-501 was far more flagrant than Johnson's 
alleged noncompliance. Fennell completely disregarded the movant's 
statement of uncontroverted facts, and "instead included only his own 
statement of undisputed facts." Id. at SI 7. Johnson, on the other hand, 
individually disputed each of UDOT's facts by number and explained why he 
disputed them. See Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 
2004 UT 23, 1 23 n. 4, 89 P.3d 155 ("[G]iven that the disputed facts 
were clearly provided in the body of the memorandum with applicable 
record references, we find the failure to comply with the technical 
requirements of rule 4-501(2)(B) to be harmless in this case."). 
Further, the trial court premised its grant of summary judgment on the 
legal conclusions surrounding several of UDOT's factual concessions. 
Additionally, Johnson does not rely on the facts from the first four 
pages to dispute UDOT's facts. So even if the trial court had ordered 
those facts stricken, instead of just ignored for purposes of determining 
which facts were undisputed, Johnson's argument on appeal is 
unaffected. 
[fn3] Given the discussion that follows on the issues of delegability and 
"retained control," we need not address whether the "peculiar risk" or 
"inherently dangerous work" doctrine is applicable. 
[fn4] The decision to allow the lane adjacent to the cutouts to remain 
open at night was clearly not a discretionary function since the decision 
was made by a UDOT on-site inspector who acts at the operational level. 
See Andrus v. State, 541 ?.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) ("[T]he supervision 
of the manner in which the work was carried out cannot be labeled 
discretionary functions."). Likewise, the failure to delineate the 
construction zone from the nearest travel lane with white striping, the 
failure to provide a buffer zone between the construction zone and the 
travel lanes, the placement of barrels inside the cutouts, and the 
missing barrels are not acts or omissions falling within the 
"discretionary function" exception. See Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of 
Transp., 1999 UT App 227, 1 37, 986 P.2d 752 ("[E]ven if the formulation 
of the plan was an immune discretionary function, immunity would not 
extend so far as to protect UDOT from liability for negligently executing 
the plan."). 
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